In the general context of smooth two-player games, this paper shows that there is a close connection between (constant) consistent conjectures in a given game and the evolutionary stability of these conjectures. Evolutionarily stable conjectures are consistent and consistent conjectures are the only interior candidates to be evolutionarily stable. Examples are provided to illustrate the result.
Introduction
Conjectures (or conjectural variations, CV) were introduced in the industrial organization literature to provide a unified framework of imperfect competition, and in this capacity they are still used in empirical investigations (Cabral, 2000, Ch. 9) . However, from a theoretical point of view, conjectural variations are considered to be problematic, as a good justification for them is difficult to find in a static setting. For example, it was argued that even consistent conjectures cannot be properly rationalized in such a case (e.g. Lindh, 1992) . Figuieres et al. (2004) survey attempts to justify conjectural variations in a dynamic setting. There are two main dynamic approaches. One considers a repeated game setting with players behaving optimally to various degrees (see e.g. Dockner, 1992; Friedman and Mezzetti, 2002 ; Jean-Marie and Tidball, 2006) . The other approach considers evolutionary models of myopic players. With this approach, in the context of a linear-quadratic duopoly model with differentiated goods, Müller and Normann (2005) showed that consistent conjectures are evolutionarily stable, while Dixon and Somma (2003) demonstrated in that model that an explicit evolutionary process converges to consistent conjectures when goods are homogeneous.
In this paper I show that the consistency of (constant) conjectures and their evolutionary stability are closely connected in the general setting of smooth two-player games. Consistent conjectures are evolutionarily stable not only for linear-quadratic duopoly models, but also for other well-behaved games. Thus this paper provides a rationale for consistent conjectures as they emerge as a stable point of an evolutionary process in many situations. The paper also provides a more convenient way to find stable points of the evolutionary process as consistent conjectures are often easier to find.
The result is illustrated on a set of examples including games with quadratic payoff functions, semi-public good games, and contest games. While the first example is a straightforward generalization of the previously known result, the evolutionary stability of consistent conjectures in the other two examples show how the general connection between the two notions works in other situations.
The Model

The Game
Consider a two-player game G = ({1, 2}, {X 1 , X 2 }, {u 1 , u 2 }), where X 1 , X 2 ⊂ R are convex strategy spaces and u 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), u 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) are payoff functions of the two players. In what follows, i refers to either Player 1 or Player 2, and j to the other player (j 6 = i). The payoff functions are assumed to be twice continuously differentiable.
I consider the following variant of the conjectural variations (CV) model. The players have (constant) conjectures about the marginal reaction of the opponent to a marginal change in strategy. Let r ij ∈ Y i ⊂ R, where Y i is a convex set, be this conjecture of Player i about Player j, that is, Player i believes that
I work with constant conjectures because they allow some selection; if conjectures depend on x i , x j then many strategy profiles can be supported by (weakly) consistent conjectures (Laitner, 1980; Boyer and Moreaux, 1983) . Since Player i believes that x j depends on x i , Player i attempts to
Since the player does not attempt to conjecture the whole reaction function x j (x i ) but only its slope dx j /dx i = r ij , x j is an independent variable, so at x * i it holds that
When ∂u i /∂x j (x * i , x j ) 6 = 0, then r ij can be equated to a ratio of partial derivatives:
i , x j ) 6 = 0 for all x j and corresponding interior best responses x * i .
Condition 1 is a natural condition in a strategic setting, requiring that a player's payoff depends on the other player's action (at the appropriate best response). If this were not the case, the player would not need to care about the other's response, making conjectures unnecessary. Let
At an interior solution x * i of Player i's maximization problem F i (x * i , x j ; r ij ) = 0. If the solution is unique and interior for each x j , F i (x i , x j ; r ij ) = 0 implicitly defines the reaction function x * i (x j ; r ij ) of Player i. To be able to use this reaction function I require Condition 2 For all r ij ∈ Y i , all x j ∈ X j , the maximization problem of Player i has a unique interior solution x * i , for i = 1, 2.
The condition guarantees that the reaction functions of the players are defined by the equations F i (x i , x j ; r ij ) = 0, F j (x i , x j ; r ji ) = 0.
Consistent Conjectures
To distinguish the consistency notion I use from that in (some of) the literature (e.g. Bresnahan, 1981 , where consistent conjectures are functions all whose derivatives are required to coincide with the corresponding derivatives of the actual reaction function in the neighborhood of equilibrium) I call a conjecture of Player i weakly consistent if the conjectured reaction of Player j equals the actual slope of the reaction function of Player j at best response, i.e. r ij = dx * j /dx i (x i ; r ji ) at x * i . When the reaction function is determined implicitly by F j (x i , x j ; r ji ) = 0, and ∂F j /∂x j (x i , x j ) 6 = 0, the slope of the reaction function can be found from the implicit function theorem. Therefore, Claim 2 At the best responses (x * i , x * j ), conjecture r ij is weakly consistent iff
when ∂F j /∂x j (x * i , x * j ; r ji ) 6 = 0.
Condition 3 implies that the reaction function is continuous and differentiable at the mutual best response point, and its slope is well defined. The conjecture can then be compared with the slope.
Conjectures r
When the game is symmetric, the reaction functions are symmetric. Then a symmetric conjecture r C = r
The Evolutionary Stability of Conjectures
Suppose that conjectures are something players are born with (one can interpret them as e.g. optimism/pessimism attitudes). Consider two large populations of players who are repeatedly randomly matched. There is a certain distribution of conjectures in the populations. In a match, players either observe each other's conjectures and behave according to an equilibrium of the game with these conjectures, or they learn to play an equilibrium, where learning is (much) faster than the evolution of conjectures. In either case, the (evolutionary) success of a given conjecture is determined by averaging the equilibrium payoffs of the players endowed with this conjecture over all matches. The proportions of players with given conjectures change according to their evolutionary success. For a conjecture r ji of Player j, the evolutionarily stable (ES) conjecture of Player i is a conjecture r ES ij such that no other conjecture r ij performs better or equally well in a population of Players i almost exclusively composed of players with conjecture r ES ij (and the rest of the population has conjecture r ij ). If in a monomorphic population of players with conjecture r ES ij a small proportion of mutants with some other conjecture r ij appears, evolutionary forces will eliminate the mutants.
The informal description in the previous paragraphs corresponds to a generalization of the indirect evolution approach of Güth and Yaari (1992) to asymmetric games and multiple equilibria. More formally, let u i (r ij , r ji ) = u i (x * i (r ij , r ji ), x * j (r ij , r ji )) be the payoff of Player i when for each pair of conjectures r ij , r ji a particular equilibrium x * i (r ij , r ji ), x * j (r ij , r ji ) is played. For a conjecture r ji of Player j, conjecture r ES ij of Player i is evolutionarily stable under equilibrium selection
for any r ij 6 = r ES ij (asymmetric games ESS; Selten, 1980) . A conjecture of Player i is evolutionarily stable against a given conjecture r ji of Player j if it is the unique best response to this conjecture r ji in the game with payoffs u i (r ij , r ji ).
If the solutions of their optimization problems are interior,
By the implicit function theorem, the system of equations
Substituting the functions, problem (3) is equivalent to
Problem (4) is exactly the problem of finding a best response conjecture for Player i against the conjecture r ji of Player j. Since problems (3) and (4) are equivalent, they have the same solution. At an interior solution of problem (3) the following first order conditions hold:
where λ, μ are Lagrangean multipliers. Since u i does not depend directly on r ij , ∂u i /∂r ij = 0. Since F j does not depend directly on r ij , ∂F j /∂r ij = 0. Furthermore, since
Condition 1 ∂u i /∂x j 6 = 0, thus ∂F i /∂r ij 6 = 0. From (5c) λ = 0 and from (5b) μ 6 = 0 and ∂F j /∂x j 6 = 0. Then (5a) and (5b) become ∂u i /∂x i +μ·∂F j /∂x i = 0 and ∂u i /∂x j + μ · ∂F j /∂x j = 0. Therefore,
Claim 3
At an interior solution of Problem (4)
Condition 4 rules out degenerate cases such as when the reaction functions are tangent to each other thus small changes in r ij , r ji may lead to a jump to another equilibrium or to multiple neighboring equilibria, in which cases functions x * i (r ij , r ji ), x * j (r ij , r ji ) would be discontinuous or ill-defined. The condition makes sure that there is a smooth selection x * i (r ij , r ji ), x * j (r ij , r ji ) from the set of equilibria as r ij , r ji vary in their respective Y i , Y j . 1 Using Claims 1 and 3, if an interior conjecture r ij is evolutionarily stable, then
By Claim 2 this means that r ij is weakly consistent. Thus Proposition 1 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisfied. If an interior conjecture r ij is evolutionarily stable against r ji under some smooth equilibrium selection x * i (r ij , r ji ), x * j (r ij , r ji ) then it is weakly consistent for this r ji .
The proposition may also be stated as follows: 1 The problem of equilibrium selection disappears if there is a unique equilibrium for all r ij , r ji . This will be the case in the examples in Section 3.
Corollary 1 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisfied. If an interior conjecture r ij is not weakly consistent for r ji , then it is not evolutionarily stable against r ji under any smooth equilibrium selection x * i (r ij , r ji ), x * j (r ij , r ji ).
For clarity, the statements are formulated using all four conditions discussed above. Not all of them are independent, and they are sufficient for the statements but not all are necessary. Local versions of conditions may be sufficient for the result; e.g. Condition 1 needs to hold only at the best response corresponding to evolutionarily stable r ij . From the proof of Claim 3, Condition 3 is implied by Conditions 1 and 2 at an interior evolutionary stable r ij , thus a local version of Condition 3 is automatically satisfied. An equilibrium selection may exist even when
and not all best responses need to be interior. The present formulation is chosen to avoid excessive technicalities, and in the examples in Section 3 the conditions will be satisfied globally.
Additional assumptions are needed for the inference from consistency to evolutionary stability. Condition 4 guarantees the existence of equilibrium selection x * i (r ij , r ji ), x * j (r ij , r ji ). If sufficient conditions for a unique global optimum of Problem (4) are satisfied, then the weak consistency of an interior conjecture r * ij implies that r * ij is an ES conjecture. One such sufficient condition is the global concavity of the payoff function.
Proposition 2 Suppose Conditions 1 to 4 are satisfied. If an interior conjecture r * ij is weakly consistent for r ji and [u i (x * i (r, r ji ), x * j (r, r ji ))] 00 r < 0 for all r, then r * ij is evolutionarily stable against r ji under the equilibrium selection
Another condition, often easier to check, is local concavity together with the uniqueness of the critical point. Thus 
The analysis above is for
When the game is symmetric, it is natural to expect players to hold symmetric conjectures. In the symmetric case, the matching can be done within one population since players' roles are indistinguishable. Although in this case evolutionary stability is not equivalent to strict best response (strict best response implies evolutionary stability but not the reverse), the propositions hold for the one-population symmetric case as well. An interior evolutionarily stable conjecture is a best response to itself, so the first order conditions have to hold, thus implying Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. Since a strict symmetric equilibrium is evolutionarily stable in the one-population symmetric case, sufficient conditions of Propositions 2 and 3 imply evolutionary stability in this case too.
A graphical illustration of the close connection between consistency and evolutionary stability is given in an example in the next section. Intuitively, r ji determines the reaction function of Player j. By varying r ij , Player i can change his own reaction function and so can change its point of intersection with the reaction function of Player j. Player i will choose a point on the reaction function of Player j where it is tangent to a level curve of Player i's payoff function. But since r ij by Claim 1 equals the slope of this level curve, best response r ij has to be equal to the slope of the reaction function of Player j, i.e. be consistent.
If conjecture r ij is consistent, Player i "knows" the reaction of Player j to small changes in x i . Thus a player with consistent conjecture maximizes the "correct" function u i (x i , x j (x i )), and so has higher payoff than when the conjecture is not consistent. Therefore the obtained result may look obvious. Nevertheless, Müller and Normann (2005, p. 500) state that "[...] the result that the evolutionarily stable conjectures coincide with the consistent conjectures is surprising as there is no obvious analogy between the two concepts." The result was also surprising for me. There was no reason to expect apriori that 'more rationality' (consistency) should lead to the same result as 'less rationality' (evolution); only after interpreting the result did the connection appear obvious.
Examples
Games with Quadratic Payoff Function
Consider the class of symmetric games with the payoff function given by
where A, B, C are parameters, A > 0, B 6 = 0, C > 0, and C > |B|. Several well-known games fall in this class, among which are the games for which the evolutionary stability of consistent conjectures was analyzed in the literature.
For example, in the differentiated goods Cournot duopoly with linear inverse demands P i (q i , q j ) = a − b i q i − b j q j and quadratic costs C i (q i ) = cq Since ∂u i /∂x j = Bx i 6 = 0 in the interior of X, Condition 1 is satisfied. Player i's problem is to maximize Ax i + Bx i x j − Cx 2 i , when dx j /dx i = r ij . The first order condition is
This implies x * i = (A + Bx j )/(2C − Br ij ). If B > 0, then consider x = ∞ for x * i to be interior. If B < 0, then x = −A/B guarantees that x * i is interior. Since ∂F i /∂x i = Br ij − 2C and ∂F i /∂x j = B, the second order condition for Player i's maximization problem is ∂F i /∂x i + r ij · ∂F i /∂x j = 2Br ij − 2C < 0.
Thus Condition 2 is satisfied and the reaction functions are given by
Since ∂F i /∂x i = Br ij − 2C 6 = 0, Condition 3 is satisfied. Finally, consider ∂F i /∂x i ·∂F j /∂x j −∂F i /∂x j ·∂F j /∂x i = (Br ij − 2C) (Br ji − 2C)−B 2 . Since C > |B| and r ij , r ji ∈ (−1, 1), then Br ij − 2C < −C and Br ji − 2C < −C.
Since the terms in the parentheses are negative, the right-hand side expression is larger than (−C)(−C) − B 2 > 0. Condition 4 is also satisfied.
The consistent symmetric conjecture can be found from
Then Br 2 −2Cr +B = 0. When B < 0, then there is one root on (−1, 1) and it is between −1 and 0. When B > 0, then the root is between 0 and 1. In any case, there is a unique consistent conjecture r C ∈ (−1, 1). By Corollary 1 it is the unique interior candidate for an evolutionarily stable conjecture. The payoff function can be written as
. The equilibrium strategy of Player i is
2 ), and
The unique solution of ∂u i /∂r ij = 0 is r ij = −B/(Br ji −2C). When r ji = r C , the unique solution is r ij = r C .
Furthermore,
at r ij = r ji = r C . The denominator of this expression is positive, and the numerator is negative, for all r ij , r ji ∈ (−1, 1). Thus ∂ 2 u i /∂r 2 ij < 0 and by Proposition 3 To get the intuition behind the result, also for the general case of the previous section, consider Figure 1 . Conjecture r 21 determines a reaction function of Player 2, which is linear and decreasing when B < 0. Varying r 12 varies the reaction function of Player 1. Three of these reaction functions are drawn in the figure. The equilibrium is on the intersection of the reaction functions, thus varying r 12 allows Player 1 to move along the given reaction function of Player 2. Some payoff level curves of Player 1 are also drawn in the figure. Payoff is increasing in the south-east direction.
Since Player 1 can vary the equilibrium point by moving along the reaction function of Player 2, the best payoff Player 1 can achieve in equilibrium is at the point where a level curve is tangent to the reaction function of Player 2. At this point the slope of the reaction function equals the slope of the payoff level curve. For Player 1, having a conjecture r 12 means that the reaction function of Player 1 cuts the level curves at points where their slope equals r 12 (by Claim 1). Therefore, conjecture r 12 equals the slope of the payoff level curves at the points of intersection with the corresponding reaction function of Player 1. At the best equilibrium for Player 1, a level curve and the reaction function of Player 2 are tangent and so evolutionary stable conjecture r 12 is equal to the slope of the reaction function of Player 2, which means that r 12 is consistent.
Semi-Public Good Games
Consider the following symmetric two player public good provision game. Players have endowments w of private good. They can contribute x i to the public good, and leave y i = w − x i of private good for consumption. Let the strategy set be X = [−w, w], which is needed to guarantee an interior best response and can be interpreted as opportunities to contribute as well as to take out of a common pool of public good. The contribution of Player j enters Player i's utility with weight β ∈ (0, 1), thus for Player i the total supply of public good is X i = x i + βx j . Players' utility functions are u i (y i , X i ). This is the model of semi-public goods considered in Costrell (1991) . Let Y = (−1, 1) .
Suppose that the utility functions are
2 The payoff function of Player i is then
For a conjecture r ij , the first order condition of the maximization problem of Player i is
This x * i is unique and interior for all x j ∈ [−w, w]. Note also that (−1, 1) . This means that Condition 2 is fulfilled, and reaction functions are given by
From the reaction function, with a consistent symmetric conjecture
implying (1−α)βr 2 +r +αβ = 0. For r ∈ (−1, 1), there is one root r C of this equation, and it is between −1 and 0. The consistent conjecture is negative, as obtained in Costrell (1991) for a more general semi-public good setup. It holds that ∂u i /∂x j = (1 − α)β (y i /X i ) α 6 = 0 in the interior of X, as required by Condition 1. Also ∂F i /∂x i 6 = 0 in equilibrium, thus Condition 3 is fulfilled. Finally, for Condition 4
By Corollary 1 the consistent conjecture is the unique interior candidate for an evolutionarily stable conjecture. Since in equilibrium X * i = (1 + βr ij )y * i (1 − α)/α, the utility function can be written as u i (r ij , r ji ) = (1 + βr ij )
The equilibrium strategy of Player i is
It holds that ∂y
The first order maximization condition ∂u i /∂r ij = 0 has the unique solution r ij = −αβ/(1 + (1 − α)βr ji ). When r ji = r C , then the solution is r ij = r C ∈ (−1, 0).
For the second order condition,
ij is determined by the signs of 1 + (1 − α)βr C and (1+(1−α)βr
ij < 0, and the consistent conjecture r C is also evolutionarily stable.
Proposition 5
In the semi-public good games of this section the unique consistent conjecture r C is the unique evolutionarily stable conjecture.
Rent-seeking games
Consider the following symmetric game, presented as a rent-seeking contest first in Tullock (1980) . Two players compete for a prize of value V by making investments x i . The probability that a player wins the prize is x i /(x i + x j ). The cost of an investment is simply x i . The (expected) payoff of Player i is
To avoid technical difficulties that do not influence the result, consider investments strictly between 0 and V , i.e. X = (0, V ). Let also Y = (−1, 1).
The first order condition of Player i's optimization problem is
The solution of this equation satisfies (x j − r ij x i ) V = (x i + x j ) 2 . When x i = 0, then the left-hand side x j V is larger than the right-hand side x 2 j . When x i = V , then the left-hand side (x j − r ij V ) V is smaller than the right-hand side (V + x j ) 2 . Since the equation is quadratic, there is a unique solution of the first order condition equation on (0, V ) for any r ij ∈ (−1, 1) and x j ∈ (0, V ).
and
At the solution of the first order condition equation
Thus locally the second order condition of Player i's optimization problem is satisfied, and the best response is found from F i = 0, that is, Condition 2 is satisfied.
When ∂F i /∂x i = 0 at the solution of the first order condition equation, then At the solution of the first order condition equations for the two players
4 . Adding up the first order condition (x j − r ij x i )V/(x i + x j ) 2 − 1 = 0 for Player i multiplied by r ji and the first order condition
Doing the analogous operation interchanging players gives
In equilibrium, the slope of the reaction function is
.
With symmetric conjectures r ij = r ji = r, the equilibrium x * i = x * j = x is symmetric, thus for a consistent symmetric conjecture r = −(V −4x)/(−V r− 4x). In symmetric equilibrium x = (1 − r)V/4. Then for a conjecture r to be consistent, r = −(V − (1 − r)V )/(−V r − (1 − r)V ) = r. That is, every r ∈ (−1, 1) is a symmetric consistent conjecture. This conforms to the result of Michaels (1989) who obtains that every r is a consistent conjecture for more general symmetric contests.
The equilibrium strategies of the players are
To maximize the fitness function u i (r ij , r ji ) at x * i , x * j find ∂u i /∂r ij = V ((x j V − (x i +x j )
2 )(−3r at r ji = r ij = r. By Proposition 3 this means that all r are evolutionarily stable.
Proposition 6
In the rent-seeking game of this section, all conjectures r ∈ (−1, 1) are consistent and evolutionarily stable.
Conclusion
It is shown that the observations of Müller and Normann (2005) and Dixon and Somma (2003) about the evolutionary stability of consistent conjectures for a particular duopoly case extend to other games because they are based on the coincidence of the first order conditions. Apart from the examples considered in this paper, other games to which the results can be applied include common pool resource exploitation games and differentiated product Bertrand duopoly. It should be possible to generalize the results to n-player aggregative games, i.e. games in which payoffs depend on own strategy and on an aggregate of strategies of the other players. In such games a conjecture can be treated as the conjecture about the aggregate reaction of the other players.
The intuition for the evolutionary stability of consistent conjectures is that a player with such a conjecture correctly estimates the response of the other player and thus maximizes the "right" function, outperforming in evolutionary terms players with other conjectures. Though this result may appear obvious ex-post, it was not so before the analysis. It is interesting that 'more rational' (consistency) and 'less rational' (evolution) approaches lead to the same outcome in many games.
The contribution of the paper can be seen as twofold. The evolutionary approach can provide a justification for consistent conjectures as emerging from a dynamic process, and the paper shows that this justification holds for many situations. On the other hand, consistent conjectures are often easier to find, simplifying the evolutionary analysis. Depending on the questions asked about a game, one or the other approach can be used, since the two approaches complement each other.
